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[899] 
Alito’s Way: Application of Justice Alito’s 
Concurring Opinion in United States v. Jones to 
Cell Phone Location Data 
Ryan Birss* 
On January 23, 2012, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in United States v. 
Jones, ruling unanimously that the government’s installation of a GPS device on Antoine 
Jones’s vehicle and the use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements constituted a 
“search” and violated the Fourth Amendment. However, the majority opinion focused 
solely on the physical trespass of placing a device on a suspect’s car.  
 
Due to advancements in technology such as cell phone location data, physical intrusion is 
unnecessary for government officials to track an individual. The limitations of the 
opinion were immediately apparent in cases like United States v. Skinner, as government 
agents circumvented the holding in Jones by merely avoiding physical trespass.  
 
This Note argues that by focusing on Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones and his three 
prongs of analysis (Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the length of tracking, and the 
type of offense) and analyzing cell phone location data as something a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in, courts can protect individuals from unchecked 
government intrusion.  
 
This Note recaps the three opinions in Jones, summarizes the current technology and the 
procedures used by government agencies to access cell phone location data, and uses the 
facts of Skinner to illustrate how the surveillance process works. This Note then discusses 
Justice Alito’s concurrence in detail and proposes several modifications to his analysis in 




 * J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2013; Articles Editor, Hastings Law 
Journal; B.S., Political Science and Business Administration, University of Oregon, 2009. I would like to 
thank the editors of the Hastings Law Journal for their commitment and hard work in preparing my Note 
for publication. This Note is dedicated to my parents for their unwavering support throughout the Note 
writing process, law school, and most of all life in general. “If you will it, Dude, it is no dream.” 
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On January 23, 2012, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision 
in United States v. Jones, ruling unanimously that the government’s 
installation of a global positioning system (“GPS”) device on Antoine 
Jones’s vehicle and the use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s 
movements constituted a “search” in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.1 After this decision, the legal landscape regarding the use 
of GPS tracking devices changed fundamentally,2 but the Justices’ 
rationales for why a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred varied 
wildly. The controlling opinion in Jones, authored by Justice Scalia and 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and 
 
 1. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
 2. Clifford S. Fishman & Anne T. McKenna, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Surveillance 
in the Internet Age § 29:37 (3d ed. 2008). 
BIRSS_11 (B. BUCHWALTER) (Do Not Delete) 4/9/2014 4:40 PM 
April 2014]       CELL PHONE LOCATION DATA 901 
Justice Sotomayor, focused on the government’s physical occupation of 
private property for the purpose of obtaining information and that “such 
a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”3 In contrast, 
Justice Alito, who concurred in judgment and was joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, focused on the Katz test and a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.4 
Jones caused a “‘sea change’ in law enforcement” that led the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) to deactivate nearly 3000 GPS 
devices that were tracking suspects at the time.5 Andrew Weissmann, 
general counsel for the FBI, stated that it was not the “majority opinion 
that caused such turmoil in the bureau, but a concurring opinion written 
by Justice Samuel Alito.”6 
Justice Alito applied existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and 
reasoned that the Court should “ask whether the use of GPS tracking in 
a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person 
would not have anticipated.”7 Under this approach, he emphasized two 
important factors to consider when determining the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in location data: (1) the length of the monitoring, 
and (2) the nature of the underlying offense.8 
Justice Sotomayor filed a separate concurrence because she agreed 
that the physical intrusion was at a minimum a Fourth Amendment 
violation, but she also discussed the reasonable expectation of privacy, 
shifts in technology, and indicated a willingness to revisit the third-party 
doctrine.9 However, she expressly agreed that “at the very least, ‘longer 
term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on 
expectations of privacy.’”10 
 
 3. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
 4. See id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 
(holding that a search occurs when the government invades a person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.). In Katz, government agents placed a listening device on a public payphone. Id. at 348. The 
Supreme Court found this to be a Fourth Amendment violation because the defendant did not 
subjectively believe that his phone conversation was being recorded, and society recognizes this 
subjective belief as reasonable. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 5. Orin S. Kerr, Concurring Opinions in Jones Lead FBI to Turn Off 3,000 GPS Devices, 
Considered a “Sea Change” Within the Bureau, Volokh Conspiracy (Mar. 8, 2012, 2:37 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2012/03/08/concurring-opinions-in-jones-lead-fbi-to-turn-off-3000-gps-devices-
considered-a-sea-change-within-the-bureau. 
 6. See id; see also Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Ruling Prompts FBI to Turn Off 3,000 
Tracking Devices, ABC News (Mar. 7, 2012, 10:40 AM), http://www.news.yahoo.com/supreme-court-
ruling-prompts-fbi-turn-off-3-154046722--abc-news.html. 
 7. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 954–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 10. Id. at 955. 
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Nevertheless, soon after the landmark ruling, federal prosecutors 
chose to retry Jones by replacing the type of evidence offered to the 
court.11 The case against Jones remained fairly similar except that the 
unconstitutional GPS location data had been replaced with his cell phone 
location data.12 As this Note goes to print—in April 2014—Jones 
continues to sit in federal custody after representing himself and entering 
a plea bargain prior to his retrial.13 Although the Jones majority focused 
on the physical intrusion of the GPS device, the opinion did not govern 
cell phone location data because law enforcement did not commit a 
physical intrusion or trespass by tracking Jones’s cell phone.  
In the midst of Jones, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals granted 
review to United States v. Skinner, a case involving warrantless cell phone 
tracking and cell phone location data.14 In Skinner, the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (“DEA”) used the defendant’s cell phone to track his movements 
along a three-day, multistate road trip as he transported 1000 pounds of 
marijuana.15 The Sixth Circuit held that there was no Fourth Amendment 
violation because Skinner did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the data transmitted by his cell phone.16 The Sixth Circuit 
argued that the holding in Jones—that a Fourth Amendment violation 
occurs when the government installs a tracking device to monitor a 
vehicle’s movements—did not apply because the Skinner case lacked a 
similar physical intrusion.17 The Sixth Circuit’s rationale in Skinner 
illustrates the inherent limitations of Justice Scalia’s property-based 
majority opinion in Jones. 
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should adopt Justice 
Alito’s concurring opinion as a framework to analyze cases concerning a 
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone data. Based on 
 
 11. See Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Cell Site Data & Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support Thereof at 6, United States v. Jones, No. 05-CR-386(1) (D.D.C Mar. 29, 2012), 
2012 WL 1576673 (including allegations by Jones’s attorney that “the government seeks to do with cell 
site data what it cannot do with the suppressed GPS data”); see also Sarah Roberts, Court Says No 
GPS Tracking? How About Cell Phone Tracking?, ACLU Blog Rts. (Apr. 6, 2012, 12:55 PM), 
http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/court-says-no-gps-tracking-how-
about-cell-phone (“[I]nstead of fixing the way it conducts this kind of invasive surveillance—[the 
government] has simply set its sights on another way to obtain people’s location information: their cell 
phones.”). 
 12. Roberts, supra note 11. 
 13. Nick Anderson & Ann E. Marimow, Former D.C. Nightclub Owner Antoine Jones Sentenced 
on Drug Charge, Wash. Post, May 1, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/antoine-jones-
pleads-guilty-to-drug-charge/2013/05/01/1109c268-b274-11e2-bbf2-a6f9e9d79e19_story.html. 
 14. See generally United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
2851 (2013). For another example, see In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th 
Cir. 2013) (“Cell site data are business records and should be analyzed under that line of Supreme 
Court precedent.”). 
 15. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 774. 
 16. Id. at 777. 
 17. Id. at 779–80. 
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her concurrence in Jones, Justice Sotomayor could provide the fifth vote 
to make this the majority opinion.18  
Part II of this Note discusses the three opinions in Jones. Part III 
summarizes the current technology and the procedures used by 
government agencies to access cell phone location data. Part IV uses the 
facts of Skinner to illustrate how the surveillance process works. Part IV 
elaborates on the shortcomings of Skinner and discusses how Justice 
Alito’s concurrence in Jones provides a framework of three prongs to 
overrule it and similar cases. Part V notes that based on her concurrence 
in Jones, Justice Sotomayor could be the fifth vote to make Justice 
Alito’s opinion the majority. Finally, Part VI briefly proposes several 
modifications to Justice Alito’s analysis in order to clarify when the 
warrantless collection of cell phone data should be deemed 
unconstitutional.  
I.  Procedural History and the Three Opinions in UNITED STATES V. 
JONES 
A. Facts 
In the fall of 2004, a FBI and the Metropolitan Police Department 
task force began investigating Antoine Jones, owner and operator of a 
nightclub in the District of Columbia, for trafficking narcotics.19 The 
government obtained a “warrant authorizing the use of an electronic 
tracking device on a Jeep Grand Cherokee registered to Jones’ wife.”20 A 
magistrate judge issued a warrant authorizing the installation of the 
device within ten days while the vehicle was located in the District of 
Columbia.21 
Eleven days after the warrant was signed, government agents 
surreptitiously installed a GPS device on the undercarriage of Jones’s 
vehicle while it was in Maryland, outside the District of Columbia.22 Using 
the device and signals from multiple satellites, the government tracked the 
vehicle’s movements for the next twenty-eight days.23 The device 
established the vehicle’s location within fifty to one hundred feet and 
 
 18. For a competing argument that Justice Alito’s concurring opinion is not helpful for future 
cases see Erin Murphy, Back to the Future: The Curious Case of United States v. Jones, 10 Ohio St. J. 
Crim. L. 325, 332 (2012) (“The greatest disappointment of the concurring opinion, therefore, is its 
refusal to even attempt a theory of Fourth Amendment applicability that would have buttressed the 
same ultimate holding, but with a test that might apply beyond the particular facts of this case.”). 
 19. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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communicated that location to a government computer.24 Over the next 
four-week period, the device transmitted more than 2000 pages of data.25 
After his indictment, Jones moved to suppress the evidence 
obtained from the warrantless use of the GPS device.26 Jones argued that 
the prolonged and constant tracking of his movements over the course of 
four weeks indicated that the search was unreasonable.27 On August 10, 
2006, the district court denied Jones’s motion to suppress in part and 
held that the data obtained from the GPS device when Jones traveled on 
public roads was admissible.28 
The District Court for the District of Columbia relied on the 
Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Knotts, a case involving a 
beeper device tracking a person traveling in a vehicle on a single trip on 
public thoroughfares.29 The court held that Knotts was binding precedent 
and equated the GPS device with the beeper despite the significant 
technological advancements since the Knotts holding in 1983.30 The court 
found Jones guilty for “conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to 
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of 
cocaine base” and sentenced him to life in prison.31 
On August 6, 2010, Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg of the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the district court’s 
decision, holding that the warrantless use of the GPS device on Jones’s 
vehicle for four weeks constituted a search and Knotts did not control.32 
Judge Ginsburg pointed to the Supreme Court’s language regarding the 
limited use of the beeper in Knotts and held that it should not apply to 
the more comprehensive and sustained monitoring of Jones.33 He also 
recognized that, in Knotts, the Supreme Court specifically reserved the 
question of the constitutionality of warrantless twenty-four hour 
surveillance.34 
The Supreme Court granted the United States’ Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari on June 27, 2011.35 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 28. United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 88 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d. in part sub nom. 
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. 
 29. 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
 30. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 88. 
 31. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948–49. 
 32. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. Jones, 
132 S. Ct. 945. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Jones, 131 S. Ct. at 3064, cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3610 (U.S. June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259). 
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B. Controlling Opinion 
Justice Scalia authored the controlling opinion in Jones, which 
focused on the physical occupation of the private property for the 
purpose of obtaining information and that “such a physical intrusion 
would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when it was adopted.”36 The Court reasoned that Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence had always been “tied to common-law 
trespass, at least until the latter half of the twentieth century.”37 The 
Court then shifted its analysis and incorporated the “reasonableness 
expectation of privacy” argument from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in 
Katz.38 Early in the twentieth century, the Court treated property rights as 
dispositive in determining the scope of the Fourth Amendment.39 Justice 
Scalia stated that the “Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has 
been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”40 
Justice Scalia also asserted that the present facts before the Court did 
not require them to answer the question of whether an unconstitutional 
invasion of privacy could be achieved through electronic means without an 
accompanying physical trespass.41 Acknowledging that its opinion only 
addressed surveillance that involves a trespass, the majority wrote that 
“[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals 
without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”42 Thus, the 
majority left cell phone tracking for another day, and its opinion is of 
limited value in analyzing future cases such as United States v. Skinner. 
C. Critique 
Legal scholars43 and, more importantly, Justice Alito,44 immediately 
criticized the limitations of the majority’s trespass-based holding for not 
 
 36. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
 37. Id. at 949–50. 
 38. Id. at 950 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 39. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 40. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952. 
 41. Id. at 954. 
 42. Id. at 953. 
 43. See Caren Myers Morrison, The Drug Dealer, the Narc, and the Very Tiny Constable: 
Reflections on United States v. Jones, 3 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 113, 114 (2012) (arguing that “United 
States v. Jones represents a missed opportunity to bring a measure of clarity to an uncharted area of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence”); Mary G. Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v. 
Jones: Commercial Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protection in a Post-Google Earth World, 15 U. Pa. 
J. Const. L. 331, 332–33 (2012) (applauding the Court for expanding its definition of a search, but 
criticizing it for failing to keep current with technology); Monica Mark, GPS Tracking, Smartphones, 
and the Inadequacy of Jones and Katz, 27 Crim. Just., Winter 2013, at 36, 37 (“Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Jones did not address the crux of the problem.”); Lauren 
Millcarek, Eighteenth Century Law, Twenty-First Century Problems: Jones, GPS Tracking, and the 
Future of Privacy, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 1101, 1110 (2012) (“[T]he majority punted on the real question 
raised by the instant case: what do we do about the invasive, long-term invasion of privacy created by 
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addressing the real issue regarding the intersection of privacy rights and 
advancements in technology. Justice Alito called the holding “unwise” as 
“[i]t strains the language of the Fourth Amendment; it has little if any 
support in current Fourth Amendment case law; and it is highly 
artificial.”45 He stated that the majority chose to decide this case involving 
twenty-first century surveillance techniques based on eighteenth-century 
tort law principals.46 Justice Alito wrote that it was impossible to imagine 
eighteenth-century situations that were analogous to the state’s tracking 
of Jones.47 Additionally, he compared Justice Scalia’s analysis to the pre-
Katz cases and the emphasis that courts had placed on technical 
trespasses.48 Justice Alito criticized this approach because it placed a 
great significance on something that most people would think is a 
relatively minor aspect of the case: “attaching to the bottom of a car a 
small object that does not interfere in any way with the car’s operation,” 
instead of focusing on what was really important in the case—“the use of 
a GPS device for long-term tracking” and data collection.49 
D. Alito’s Way 
Returning to traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice 
Alito focused on whether the FBI violated Jones’s reasonable expectation 
 
limitless, technologically powered government surveillance?”). But see Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking 
Out of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United States v. Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. 
Rev. 1, 16–17 (2012) (stating “it is a mistake to treat the decision as a narrow one”). For a more 
expansive list of commentaries, see Daniel T. Pesciotta, I’m Not Dead Yet: Katz, Jones, and the Fourth 
Amendment in the 21st Century, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 187, 230–36 (2012). 
 44. Alito’s various critiques of the majority opinion included: (1) “[d]isharmony with a substantial 
body of existing case law,” (2) the majority “disregards what is really important,” (3) their approach 
provides incongruous results (amount of time tracking based on ownership of car), and (4) a variety in 
Fourth Amendment coverage for individuals in different states based on the community property laws 
of their home state. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961–62 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 45. Id. at 958. 
 46. Id. (“Is it possible to imagine a case in which a constable secreted himself somewhere in a 
coach and remained there for a period of time in order to monitor the movements of the coach’s 
owner?”). But see id. at 950 n.3 (majority opinion) (including Justice Scalia’s response: “[I]t is quite 
irrelevant whether there was an 18th-century analog. Whatever new methods of investigation may be 
devised, our task, at a minimum, is to decide whether the action in question would have constituted a 
‘search’ within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment”). 
 47. Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 48. Id. at 959 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961)) (“In the early 
electronic surveillance cases, the Court concluded that a Fourth Amendment search occurred when 
private conversations were monitored as a result of an ‘unauthorized physical penetration into the 
premises occupied’ by the defendant.”). But see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928) 
(holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply because “[t]he taps from house lines were made in 
the streets near the houses”), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (holding that no 
search occurred where a “detectaphone” was placed on the outer wall of defendant’s office for the 
purpose of overhearing conversations held within the room). 
 49. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher 
Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to 
Location Data that Congress Could Enact, 27 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 117, 149 (2012). 
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of privacy.50 In Katz, FBI agents attached an electronic listening and 
recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth that the 
petitioner used to place illegal gambling wagers.51 The Court concluded 
that the petitioner intended to exclude others from listening in on his 
conversation and that what a person knowingly exposes to the public is 
not subject to Fourth Amendment protection.52 Conversely, what one 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may 
be constitutionally protected.53 Therefore, the government’s actions 
violated Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy.54 
After Katz, an individual’s property rights and a government trespass 
were no longer dispositive for a Fourth Amendment violation.55 Courts 
have concluded that application of Katz to Fourth Amendment violations 
“depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether 
the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the invaded place.”56 Since Katz, the two-factor 
analysis examines (1) whether a defendant displays conduct consistent 
with a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) whether such subjective 
expectation is one that society, objectively, is willing to find reasonable 
to the point it would be adopted.57 
In analyzing Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy, Justice Alito 
argued that the proper approach is to apply existing Fourth Amendment 
doctrine and “ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case 
involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have 
anticipated.”58 Under this approach, he emphasized the length of the 
monitoring and the nature of the offense.59 
According to Justice Alito, relatively short-term monitoring of a 
person’s movements on public streets, similar to those upheld in United 
States v. Knotts, is reasonable because it does not involve a “degree of 
intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”60 
However, he stated that “the use of longer term GPS monitoring in 
 
 50. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 51. 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). 
 52. Id. at 351–52. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 353. 
 55. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct 945, 960 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984)) (“The existence of a property right is but one element in 
determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. The premise that property interests 
control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.”); see also id. (quoting 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001)) (“We have since decoupled violation of a person’s 
Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory violation of his property.”). 
 56. Id. (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)). 
 57. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 58. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983)). 
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investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”61 
For these types of offenses, “society’s expectation has been that law 
enforcement agents and others would not . . . secretly monitor and 
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long 
period.”62 Justice Alito did not conclude how long is too long, but that 
the surveillance “surely” became unconstitutional before the four-week 
mark.63 One scholar has called Justice Alito’s approach “revolutionary” 
for adding two new criteria to the Court’s analysis of an objective privacy 
expectation: (1) a “temporal limit on surveillance,” and (2) an “offense-
specific distinction.”64 
Additionally, Justice Alito did not consider “whether prolonged 
GPS monitoring in the context of investigations involving extraordinary 
offenses would similarly intrude on a constitutionally protected sphere of 
privacy.”65 In extraordinary cases, Justice Alito stated that “long-term 
tracking might have been mounted using previously available 
techniques.”66 An offense-specific standard “provides an exception to 
Justice Alito’s temporal limit.”67 
While analyzing an expectation of privacy, Justice Alito focused on 
how technology can change those expectations and how “dramatic 
technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations” 
are unsettled, resulting in “significant changes in popular attitudes” 
about privacy.68 He stated that one of the most significant technological 
changes was that “cell phones and other wireless devices now permit 
wireless carriers to track and record the location of users.”69 The DEA 
took advantage of Justice Alito’s concern about technological changes as 
they tracked suspects like Skinner without warrants. 
II.  Overview of the Technology in UNITED STATES V. SKINNER 
A. Technology: Cell Phone Location Data 
Due to advancements in technology, the government does not need 
to physically intrude on a person’s property to track a person’s location.70 
At the time of Jones, there were more than 322 million wireless devices 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Arcila, Jr., supra note 43, at 42. 
 65. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 66. Id. 
 67. For a critique of the offense-based analysis, see Arcila, Jr., supra note 43, at 66. 
 68. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 69. Id. at 963. 
 70. Mark, supra note 43, at 37. For another example involving “black boxes” in vehicles, see 
Mandatory Black Boxes in Cars Raise Privacy Questions, Elec. Frontier Found. (Feb. 11, 2013), 
https://www.eff.org/press/releases/mandatory-black-boxes-cars-raise-privacy-questions. 
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in use in the United States.71 Network tracking has become increasingly 
precise due to congressional mandates to develop wireless location 
technology in order to enhance the nation’s emergency response system.72 
For example, the Federal Communications Commission mandated that, as 
of September 11, 2012, “network-based tracking for 911 calls must be 
accurate to within 100 meters for 67 percent of calls and 300 meters for 
90 percent of calls.”73 
At the time of Jones, almost thirty-six percent of households were 
“wireless only,” meaning they had no landline.74 One court stated that 
the “inexorable combination of market and regulatory stimuli ensures 
that cell phone tracking will become more precise with each passing 
year.”75 Cell site data is “simply data sent from a cellular phone tower to 
the cellular provider’s computers.”76 Cell phones transmit radio signals to 
cell towers or cell sites when they are turned on so the radio signal data is 
cell site data.77 The modern state of this technology was examined in In re 
U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data.78 According to that court: 
[C]ell site data for a typical adult user will reveal between 20 and 55 
location points a day. This data is sufficient to plot the target’s 
movements hour by hour for the duration of the . . . period covered by 
the government’s request. . . . If registration data were also collected by 
the provider and made available, as the Government has requested, such 
records would track the user on a minute by minute basis, compiling a 
continuous log of his life, awake and asleep, for [the] . . . period.79 
As such, “the data can be utilized to ascertain the location of a cell phone 
and the user’s physical location if the user possesses the phone and the 
phone is turned on.”80 Thus, the government does not need to physically 
intrude on a person’s property to track their location because they can 
 
 71. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring) (referring to Wireless Quick Facts, CTIA: 
Wireless Ass’n (Nov. 2013), http://www.ctia.org/consumer_info/index.cfm/AID/10323). 
 72. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833 (S.D. Tex. 2010), vacated, 
724 F.3d 600 (2013). 
 73. Aaron Blank, The Limitations and Admissibility of Using Historical Cellular Site Data to 
Track the Location of a Cellular Phone, 18 Rich. J.L. & Tech., Fall 2011, at 1, 10 (referring to 911 
Service, 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h)(1) (2011)). 
 74. Wireless Quick Facts, supra note 71. 
 75. In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. 
Supp. 2d 747, 755 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 76. United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 949 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated sub nom. Garner v. United 
States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005). 
 77. United States v. Bermudez, No. IP 05-43-CR-B/F, 2006 WL 3197181, at *6 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 
2006), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2007) (relying on In re 
Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 751). 
 78. See 747 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2010), vacated, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Cell 
Site Location Data, 13 Crim. Prac. Guide, Jan./Feb. 2012, at 3, 4 [hereinafter Crim. Prac. Guide]. 
 79. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d. at 835. 
 80. United States v. Skinner, No. 3:06-CR-100, 2007 WL 1556596, at *11 (E.D. Tenn. May 24, 
2007) (citations omitted), adhered to on reconsideration, No. 3:07-CR-89, 2008 WL 304861 (E.D. Tenn. 
Jan. 31, 2008), aff’d, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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merely monitor a person’s movements by analyzing their cell phone 
location data.  
In order for a cell phone to make and receive calls or transmit data, it 
must be in constant connection with the cellular network and nearby 
cellular towers.81 “The proximity of cell towers varies by provider, by 
location, and over time.”82 Additionally, the use of triangulation can enable 
analysts to achieve much greater precision and reduce the area in which a 
target is generated to improve accuracy of the technology.83 Additionally, 
the production of triangulation data cannot be disabled.84 As such, since 
the government rarely has to make a physical intrusion to gain access to 
this information, Jones provides no protection for this type of surveillance. 
B. Technology: Pinging 
Pinging technology is routinely used by law enforcement officials to 
investigate and track suspects without the use of a search warrant.85 
Pinging occurs when the government calls the target’s cell phone in a 
manner that is undetectable to the cell phone user.86 By calling the 
phone, the government officers make the phone search for nearby cell 
towers so that the location of the phone can be recorded in the location 
data.87 As one court has explained: 
Cellular service providers typically do not maintain records of the GPS 
coordinates of cellular telephones operating on their network, but the 
provider may generate such location data at any time by sending a 
signal directing the built-in satellite receiver in a particular cellular 
telephone to calculate its location and transmit the location data back 
to the service provider.88  
Pinging is another example of technology not covered by Scalia’s 
property-based holding in Jones, as there is no physical trespass. However, 
Alito’s concurring opinion would likely give citizens some form of 
protection from this type of unchecked government intrusion. One 
 
 81. Scott A. Fraser, Making Sense of New Technologies and Old Law: A New Proposal for 
Historical Cell-Site Location Jurisprudence, 52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 571, 578–79 (2012). 
 82. Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not 
Fact, 70 Md. L. Rev. 681, 710 (2011) (citing Paul Bedell, Wireless Crash Course 28–31 (2d ed. 2005)). 
 83. Id. at 712. 
 84. Id. In addition to cell towers, there is the growing concern over the government’s use of 
“Stingray” technology, which “act[] as fake cell-phone tower[s] small enough to fit in a van [and] 
allow[]” for the government to collect cell information. See Hanni Fakhoury, When a Secretive Stingray 
Cell Phone Tracking “Warrant” Isn’t a Warrant, Elec. Frontier Found. (Mar. 28, 2013), 
https://www.eff.org/ deeplinks/2013/03/when-stingray-warrant-isnt-warrant. 
 85. Daniel K. Gelb, United States v. Skinner: Using a Cell Phone Is Not a Consent to Search, The 
Champion, Nov. 2012, at 30, 31. 
 86. Freiwald, supra note 82, at 704. 
 87. Id. at 702. 
 88. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified 
Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 534 (D. Md. 2011). 
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example is Sprint Nextel’s history of providing law enforcement agencies 
with customer location data more than eight million times between 
September 2008 and October 2009.89 They provided law enforcement 
with a web portal to conduct automated “pings” to track users, which 
allowed government agents to simply type in a suspect’s phone number 
and obtain the GPS coordinates of the phone.90 
C. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d): How Government Agencies Access Location 
Data 
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
(“CALEA”) requires telecommunications providers to assist law 
enforcement officials in isolating certain “call-identifying” information, 
defined to include “dialing or signaling information that identifies the 
origin, direction, destination, or termination of a communication.”91 The 
major wireless carriers received more than 1.3 million requests from law 
enforcement in 2011 alone.92 
CALEA precludes the government from acquiring location 
information about the subscriber solely pursuant to pen register and trap 
and trace device statutes.93 However, CALEA provides an exception 
when the location may be determined from the telephone number itself, 
for example a landline that has an ascertainable address.94 To gain access 
to this location data, law enforcement agents must comply with the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”).95 ECPA 
extended the Federal Wiretap Act’s protections to electronic 
communications.96 “Title II of the ECPA created a new chapter of the 
criminal code dealing with access to stored communications and 
transaction records.”97 This portion of the statute is commonly referred 
to as the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), and 18 U.S.C. § 2703 is 
 
 89. Kim Zetter, Feds ‘Pinged’ Sprint GPS Data 8 Million Times Over a Year, Wired (Sept. 12, 
2009, 5:42 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/12/gps-data. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001(2), 1002(a)(2) (2014); see also James G. Carr & Patricia L. Bellia, 
1 Law of Electronic Surveillance § 4:84 (2014). 
 92. Will Oremus, Law Enforcement Wants Your Private Cellphone Data. Wireless Carriers Will 
Hand it Over, for a Fee, Slate (July 9, 2012), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/07/09/ 
ed_markey_wireless_surveillance_report_law_enforcement_requests_private_cell_phone_data_1_3_m
illion_times_a_year.html. 
 93. Carr & Bellia, supra note 91, § 4:84. 
 94. Id.  
 95. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified 
Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 571 (D. Md. 2011); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22). 
 96. Christian Levis, Smartphone, Dumb Regulations: Mixed Signals in Mobile Privacy, 
22 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 191, 204 (2011). 
 97. In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. 
Supp. 2d 747, 752 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
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essential to phone location data.98 “The SCA reflects Congress’s judgment 
that users have a legitimate interest in the confidentiality of electronic 
communications stored on third-party servers.”99 Section 2703 authorizes 
government access to stored communications or transaction records in the 
hands of third-party service providers.100 It covers content information, 
such as text messages and e-mails, and non-content information, such as 
logs made by a networker server and cell phone records.101 
For content, a distinction is made at the 180-day mark of storage. If 
the information has been stored for less than 180 days, then a warrant is 
required.102 The law triggers a different process (discussed below) if the 
information is stored for more than 180 days.103 The court order under 
this statute, “often referred to as a ‘2703(d)’ order or simply a ‘d’ order, 
is something like a mix between a subpoena and a search warrant.”104 
These “d” orders can be used to gain access to cell phone location data.105 
Location data from cell phones is considered non-content. Courts 
have held that location data from cell phone calls is obtainable under a 
§ 2703(d) order and that such an order does not require the traditional 
probable cause determination that warrants require:106 
 
 98. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2014). 
 99. Marc J. Zwillinger & Christian S. Genetski, Criminal Discovery of Internet Communications 
Under the Stored Communications Act: It’s Not a Level Playing Field, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
569, 573 (2007). 
 100. Id. at 581–82. 
 101. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to 
Amending It, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208, 1210–11, 1219 (2004). 
 102. “A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communication 
service of the contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an 
electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant 
issued using the procedures.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (emphasis added). 
 103. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
 104. Kerr, supra note 101, at 1219. For a chart organizing the differences in a clear way, see id. at 
1223. 
 105. Id. at 1218.  
 106. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to 
Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010). Other courts have also concluded that a 
warrant is not needed for cell site location data, interpreting the Stored Communications Act (the 
“SCA”) as requiring only an administrative subpoena or a showing of reasonable grounds to obtain a 
court order for the disclosure. See e.g., In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-
Site Info., No. 11-MC-0113, 2011 WL 679925 at *2 (E.D. N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), abrogated by In re 
Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, No. 13-MJ-242, 2013 WL 5583711 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2013) 
(abrogated by Magistrate Orenstein, who had denied a similar request); United States v. Dye, 
No. 1:10-221, 2011 WL 1595255 at *9 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2011) (finding no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in cell phone records), aff’d, No. 11-3934, 2013 WL 4712733 (Sept. 3, 2013); United States v. 
Benford, No. 2:09-86, 2010 WL 1266507 at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010); In re U.S. for an Order 
Authorizing the Use of Two Pen Register & Trap and Trace Devices, 632 F. Supp. 2d 202, 211 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (authorizing pen register trap and trace devices divulging cell site data only at the 
beginning and end of specific calls); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. CR-0023, 2008 WL 4200156 at 
*10 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008). See generally Crim. Prac. Guide, supra note 78. 
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A court order . . . may be issued by any court that is a court of 
competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity 
offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication, or the records or other information sought, are 
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.107  
Hence, the government’s burden of proof has been lowered and 
only requires a “specific and articulable facts” standard.108 Under this 
standard, “the government may seek any information that is materially 
relevant to an ongoing investigation. . . . [including] acquisition of 
location data that will not yield evidence of crime but that instead will 
yield information that will aid the investigation.”109 The Judge will sign 
the order if she determines that a factual showing has been made.110 The 
Judge’s signed order is then served like an ordinary subpoena and a 
government investigator brings or faxes the Judge’s order to the 
telephone company, which produces the requested information.111 
However, under the SCA, any communication from a “tracking 
device” is excluded from the definition of “electronic communication.”112 
Tracking devices are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3117 and a warrant based 
on probable cause is required.113 Unfortunately, there is no clear standard 
and courts are split as to whether or not a cell phone can be considered a 
tracking device. A tracking device is defined as “an electronic or 
mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a 
person or object.”114 Therefore, if the “electronic communication” sought 
under § 2703 is information derived from a device which “permits the 
tracking of movement of a person or object” that electronic 
communication cannot be obtained under § 2703.115 In contrast, if a cell 
phone is not a tracking device, the government can gather the 
information. Courts are split as to whether or not a warrant is required.116 
As no physical intrusion exists with these types of government 
 
 107. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
 108. See generally In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location 
Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005). For an illustrative example, see generally United States v. 
Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012). 
 109. Freiwald, supra note 82, at 696–97. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.  
 112. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C) (2012). 
 113. 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2012). 
 114. Id. 
 115. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C). 
 116. For cases where warrant was required, see In re Application of U.S. for Orders Authorizing 
the Installation & Use of Pen Registers, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 397 (D. Md. 2006); In re Application for 
Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756 (S.D. Tex. 
2005); In re Application of U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & 
Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 
304 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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surveillance techniques, the Jones majority decision provides little 
protection. The application of these surveillance techniques is illustrated 
below as applied to Skinner. 
III.  UNITED STATES V. SKINNER 
The limitations of the majority’s holding became apparent soon 
after Jones. The majority’s holding cannot reach cell phone location data, 
pinging, or “d” orders because no physical trespass takes place. The facts 
of Skinner show, however, that the government can essentially do the 
same type of surveillance that was held unconstitutional in Jones by 
replacing the GPS device with these nonphysical intrusion techniques. 
A. Facts 
In January 2006, the DEA began investigating a large-scale drug 
distribution network run by James Michael West for which Melvin 
Skinner worked as a courier.117 The investigation began after authorities 
pulled over another courier, Christopher S. Shearer, in Flagstaff, Arizona 
with $362,000.118 Police intercepted Shearer immediately before he 
attempted to deliver money to Philip Apodaca, West’s marijuana 
supplier.119 Shearer became a confidential informant and told the 
authorities how West operated his drug conspiracy.120 
The DEA learned that West purchased “pay-as-you-go” cell phones 
for the members of his network to facilitate safe communication.121 He 
provided false names and addresses for the phone subscriber information 
that were then programmed with contact information and given to the 
couriers to maintain communication.122 Skinner acted as a courier, 
delivering money to Arizona and then returning to Tennessee with 
hundreds of pounds of marijuana.123 
In June 2006, authorities determined that Skinner was using one of 
the “pay-as-you-go” cell phones to communicate with West.124 Authorities 
obtained a section 2703 order125 from a federal magistrate judge on July 12, 
2006, “authorizing the phone company to release subscriber information, 
cell-site information, GPS real-time location, and ‘ping’ data” for the 
phone in order to learn Skinner’s location while he was transporting the 
 
 117. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (2013). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. For specifics, see Affidavit attached to Court Order, available at https://docs.google.com/ 
file/d/1gr1bscSXqb7pXfIi7GXaM5Ywg5sUg-hblBeuodjiasl5KcZ1BQVbPbnKlr5y/edit (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2014) [hereinafter Skinner Order]. 
 121. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 775. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 775–76. 
 124. Id. at 775. 
 125. See supra Part II.B. 
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marijuana.126 The confidential informant provided most of the specific 
and articulable facts in an affidavit.127 The authorities asked for thirty 
days of historical data and sixty days real-time location and “ping” 
data.128 When it turned out that the first cell phone number was still in 
West’s possession in North Carolina, authorities then sought and 
obtained a second order from the magistrate judge to “ping” the second 
cell phone number and locate Skinner.129 
This information revealed that the cell phone was located near 
Flagstaff, Arizona.130 By continuously “pinging”131 the phone, the DEA 
learned that Skinner had departed Tucson, Arizona on Friday, July 14, 
2006, and traveled on Interstate 40 across Texas.132 The agents did not 
follow the vehicle or conduct any type of visual surveillance at any 
time.133 With the magistrate judge’s authorization under the § 2703 order, 
the government agents received location information from the cell phone 
company to track the exact location of the vehicle that was carrying the 
load of marijuana.134 The information obtained from Skinner’s cell phone 
led the DEA agents to locate Skinner at a rest stop inside a motor home 
filled with more than 1100 pounds of marijuana.135 
DEA agents arrested Skinner and subsequently charged him with 
conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute in excess 
of 1000 kilograms of marijuana, conspiracy to commit money laundering, 
and aiding and abetting the attempt to distribute in excess of 100 
kilograms of marijuana.136 After a ten-day trial, the jury found Skinner 
guilty on all counts.137 
 
 126. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 776. See, e.g., Skinner Order, supra note 120; see also Jennifer Granick, 
UPDATED: Sixth Circuit Cell Tracking Case Travels Down the Wrong Road, Ctr. for Internet & 
Soc’y (Aug. 14, 2012 9:24 PM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2012/08/updated-sixth-circuit-cell-
tracking-case-travels-down-wrong-road (“The orders show that the court authorized pinging and GPS 
tracking on a real time basis under 18 USC 2703(c)(1)(B) and 2703(d). ‘Whoa’, you are saying to 
yourselves. ‘You mean, the court authorized real time tracking based on a provision of the Stored 
Communications Act, without even a reference to the Pen Register statute or CALEA? That can’t be 
right.’ Well, its not right, but that’s what the Court did.”). 
 127. Skinner Order, supra note 120, at 12–16.  
 128. Id. at 2. 
 129. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 776. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See supra Part II.A. 
 132. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 776. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 779. 
 135. Id. at 774. 
 136. Id. at 776 (including violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1),(b)(1)(A) and violations of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1956(h), 2). 
 137. Id. at 777. 
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B. Skinner’s Motion to Suppress and Subsequent Appeal 
Skinner moved to suppress the search of the motorhome pursuant to 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment, arguing that the government 
agents’ use of GPS location information was a warrantless and 
unconstitutional search.138 At an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge: 
[O]pined that because the cell phone was utilized on public 
thoroughfares and was ‘bought by a drug supplier and provided to . . . 
Skinner as part and parcel of his drug trafficking enterprise,’ Skinner 
did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone or in the 
motorhome that was driven on public roads.139 
Furthermore, the magistrate judge recommended that Skinner’s motion 
be rejected because he lacked standing for not subscribing to the cell 
phone plan in his own name.140 
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, Skinner argued that: 
[T]he government’s request for cell site location information, along 
with real time GPS data and ‘ping’ data . . . in regard to the cellular 
telephone in Skinner’s possession was based on the Stored 
Communications Act found at 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. This type of 
information is considered prospective, as opposed to historical; and is 
not subject to disclosure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703.141 
Rather, Skinner proposed that the monitoring of cell site location 
information, GPS data, and ping data are types of electronic surveillance, 
and searching such information requires a warrant pursuant to the 
Fourth Amendment.142 
C. Opinion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
The Sixth Circuit rejected Skinner’s appeal of the district court’s 
denial of the motion to suppress. The Sixth Circuit held that there was no 
Fourth Amendment violation because “Skinner did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the data” transmitted by his 
voluntarily procured pay-as-you-go cell phone.”143 Thus, the court held 
that “suppression was not warranted and the district court correctly 
denied Mr. Skinner’s motion to suppress.”144 Additionally, the court 
reasoned that a criminal cannot be “entitled to rely on the expected 
 
 138. Id. at 776. 
 139. Id. 
 140. United States v. Skinner, No. 3:06-CR-100, 2007 WL 1556596, at *14–15 (E.D. Tenn. May 24, 
2007) adhered to on reconsideration, No. 3:07-CR-89, 2008 WL 304861 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 31, 2008), 
aff’d, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012), cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (2013). 
 141. Brief of Appellant at 30, United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012) (No. 09-6497), 
2010 WL 7355232, at *30. 
 142. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 781. 
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untrackability of his tools.”145 The court stated that if a device used to 
transport contraband gives off a signal that can be tracked for location, 
the police can track the signal.146 
The court stated that its opinion was consistent with United States v. 
Knotts.147 Similar to Knotts, Skinner “travel[ed] on a public road before 
he stopped at a public rest stop.”148 Although the cell site information 
aided the police in determining Skinner’s location, that same information 
could have been obtained through visual surveillance.149 The court stated: 
Otherwise, dogs could not be used to track a fugitive if the fugitive did 
not know that the dog hounds had his scent. A getaway car could not 
be identified and followed based on the license plate number if the 
driver reasonably thought he had gotten away unseen. The recent 
nature of cell phone location technology does not change this. If it did, 
then technology would help criminals but not the police. It follows that 
Skinner had no expectation of privacy in the context of this case, just as 
the driver of a getaway car has no expectation of privacy in the 
particular combination of colors of the car’s paint.150 
The court also emphasized that it stayed consistent with Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, as “the [g]overnment never had physical 
contact with Skinner’s cell phone; he obtained [the phone], GPS 
technology and all, and could not object to its presence.”151 
Also, the court reasoned that because the cell site data is simply a 
substitution for Skinner’s visually observable location, he had “no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in his movements along public highways” 
and “the Supreme Court’s decision in Knotts is controlling.”152 The Skinner 
Court went on to discuss United States v. Jones and distinguished the case 
on two grounds.153 First, discussed in Part II, the Jones majority based its 
decision on the fact that the police had to “physically occup[y] private 
property for the purpose of obtaining information,” which was not 
present in this case.154 Second, the Sixth Circuit distinguished the case 
 
 145. Id. at 777. But see Gelb, supra note 85, at 30 (“Ironically, it appears the Sixth Circuit 
perceived the defendant’s use of a prepaid or “pay-as-you-go” cell phone as evidence of defendant’s 
subjective intent not to be followed.”). 
 146. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777. 
 147. Id. (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)). 
 148. Id. at 778.  
 149. Id. at 778–79. 
 150. Id. at 777; cf. Recent Cases, Criminal Procedure—Fourth Amendment—Sixth Circuit Holds 
that “Pinging” a Target’s Cell Phone to Obtain Gps Data Is Not a Search Subject to the Warrant 
Requirement—United States v. Skinner, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 806 (2013) [hereinafter Recent Cases] 
(“To revise one of the Sixth Circuit’s analogies, it was as if the police could somehow remotely force 
an otherwise odorless suspect to create a scent for the dogs to follow.”). 
 151. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 781. 
 152. Id. at 779 (quoting United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951–52 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 
543 U.S. 1100 (2005). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 780 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012)). 
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from Justice Alito’s concurrence as “Jones involved intensive monitoring 
over a 28-day period, here the DEA agents only tracked Skinner’s cell 
phone for three days.”155 The Skinner Court analyzed Justice Alito’s 
opinion and stated that there was no “extreme comprehensive tracking” 
in the case before them.156 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit held that the Jones 
holding did not apply.157 
IV.  Alito’s Concurrence and UNITED STATES V. SKINNER 
Before analyzing Justice Alito’s opinion, it is important to review 
the text of the Fourth Amendment: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.158 
As the Supreme Court once wrote, “the familiar history of the 
Amendment need not be recounted here, we should remember that it 
reflects a choice that our society should be one in which citizens ‘dwell in 
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.’”159  
As the Supreme Court has also noted that “[t]he point of the Fourth 
Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it 
denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which 
reasonable men can draw from evidence.”160 Rather, the Fourth 
Amendment “requir[es] that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”161 Furthermore, 
citizens like Jones, Skinner, and others suspected of drug offenses are no 
less entitled to Fourth Amendment protections than those suspected of 
non-drug offenses.162 
In analyzing Skinner’s reasonable expectation of privacy—and other 
cases involving cell phone location data—Justice Alito would apply 
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and “ask whether the use of GPS 
tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a 
reasonable person would not have anticipated.”163 He would also consider 
the length of the monitoring and the nature of the suspect’s underlying 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 780–81. 
 158. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 159. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 217 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 
14 (1948)). 
 160. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13–14. 
 161. Id. at 14. 
 162. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984). 
 163. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012). 
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offense.164 After analyzing these three prongs of Justice Alito’s 
concurrence in Jones, this Note asserts that he would hold that the type 
of surveillance in Skinner violates a suspect’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
A. Existing Doctrine 
Justice Alito focuses on the Katz test when discussing existing 
Fourth Amendment doctrine.165 This Note asserts that the Skinner court 
incorrectly applied the Katz test, which has been modified and refined by 
cases like United States v. Knotts,166 and ignored United States v. Kyllo167 
entirely. 
In Katz, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
“protects people, not places.”168 Further elucidating this concept, Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence set forth a two-part test to determine whether an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.169 First, a person must 
have “exhibited an actual . . . expectation of privacy and, second, the 
expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.”170  
Subsequently, the Court applied and refined the Katz test when it 
held that “a person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one 
place to another” because he voluntarily has shown his progress and 
route to anyone that wants to look.171 In Knotts, the police placed a 
beeper in a container and monitored its movements along a single drive 
by Knotts’s co-conspirator from the chemical factory to Knotts’s home.172 
The Court acknowledged the government’s limited use of this particular 
beeper.173 The Court reasoned that a police car following at distance 
throughout the co-conspirator’s journey “could have observed him 
leaving the public highway and arriving at the cabin owned by 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 960. 
 166. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 167. 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when the government 
gains access to a constitutionally protected area by using a device or technology that is not available to 
the common public). In Kyllo, government agents used a thermal imaging device to detect high levels 
of infrared radiation inside defendant’s home. Id. at 31. The agent inferred that the defendant was 
using halide lights to grow marijuana. Id. The government then used the information obtained from 
the thermal imaging device to secure a warrant and subsequently prosecuted the defendant for 
manufacturing marijuana. Id.  
 168. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 169. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 170. Id. 
 171. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983). 
 172. Id. at 278. 
 173. Id. at 284–85. 
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respondent, with the drum of chloroform still in the car.”174 As such, the 
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because his 
public movements were potentially observable.175 
The Skinner court tried to analogize its facts with those of Knotts.176 
Skinner was immediately criticized as a “good example of how legal 
precedent, although ever-evolving, is not necessarily progressing in lock 
step with technology and the realities of the ways in which it is being 
embraced by modern society.”177 It was also critiqued as a “troubling 
development” in post-Jones jurisprudence.178 For example, the court 
stated that because of the criminal nature of Skinner’s activities, he “had 
no expectation of privacy . . . just as the driver of a getaway car has no 
expectation of privacy in the particular combination of colors of the car’s 
paint.”179 But “[t]his analysis neglects the objective prong of the 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test—whether society would accept as 
reasonable the fugitive’s and getaway driver’s purported beliefs that they 
had ‘gotten away unseen.’”180 This lack of analyzing the objectivity prong 
contrasts with Justice Alito’s approach of relying on existing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. 
The court then stated that Knotts supported this rationale because 
“[s]imilar to the circumstances in Knotts, Skinner was traveling on a 
public road before he stopped at a public rest stop.”181 The court argued 
that these situations were parallel because the cell site information that 
aided the police in determining Skinner’s location could have been 
obtained through visual surveillance.182 The timing of the government’s 
use of surveillance in its investigation is one important distinction 
between Knotts and Skinner. In Skinner’s case: 
[P]olice had not and could not establish visual contact with Skinner 
without utilizing electronic surveillance because they had not yet 
identified the target of their search. Authorities did not know the 
identity of their suspect, the specific make and model of the vehicle he 
would be driving, or the particular route by which he would be 
traveling.183 
 
 174. Id. at 285. 
 175. Id.  
 176. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777–78 (6th Cir. 2012), cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 2851 
(2013). 
 177. Gelb, supra note 85, at 30. 
 178. Richard Sobel et al., The Fourth Amendment Beyond Katz, Kyllo and Jones: Reinstating 
Justifiable Reliance As A More Secure Constitutional Standard for Privacy, 22 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 1, 34, 
37 (2013). 
 179. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777. 
 180. Sobel et al., supra note 178, at 39. 
 181. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 778. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 786 (Donald, Circuit Justice, concurring). 
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This is in sharp contrast to the investigation in Knotts, as the police 
watched the defendant make a purchase, followed his car in which the 
contraband had been placed, and maintained contact by using both visual 
surveillance and the tracking device.184 
The type of technology used is another distinction between the 
surveillance in Knotts and Skinner. The Sixth Circuit in Skinner 
erroneously equated modern day cell location data with a police beeper. 
Courts should not equate cell phone location data with beepers due to the 
advancements in technology discussed in Part III. The prolonged 
collection of cell location data is much more advanced than the Knotts 
beeper. In United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court explained that the 
beeper technology is not even accurate enough to determine in which 
storage locker the suspect had stored the bugged drum.185 Additionally, 
the Court noted in Knotts that the beeper provided limited information 
and the signals were periodically lost.186  
[T]he beepers used in Knotts and Karo were simple radio transmitters 
of limited range that forced the agents tracking the device to stay in 
close physical proximity to the device. In contrast, the functionality of 
the cell phone data is essentially unlimited by any distance between 
device and agent. Additionally, the beeper device only provides low-
resolution directional information, including the approximate angle 
between the receiver and the beeper and the approximate distance as 
judged by signal strength.187 
Another distinction between cell phone data and the information 
collected from a beeper is the amount of detail that these devices can 
accumulate.188  
Location information reveals everything from daily habits like stopping 
at the same coffee shop on the way to work, to associations with other 
people, to visits to locales that reveal much more about a person’s 
particular characteristics, affiliations or beliefs—such as a gay bar, a 
doctor’s office, HIV testing facility, or abortion clinic; a certain church, 
 
 184. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983). 
 185. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 703, 708 (1984). 
 186. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278. 
 187. David H. Goetz, Locating Location Privacy, 26 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 823, 839 (2011). 
 188. See infra note 220. This is commonly referred to as the “mosaic theory.” See Orin S. Kerr, The 
Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 311, 320 (2012) (“The mosaic theory 
requires courts to apply the Fourth Amendment search doctrine to government conduct as a collective 
whole rather than in isolated steps. Instead of asking if a particular act is a search, the mosaic theory 
asks whether a series of acts that are not searches in isolation amount to a search when considered as a 
group. The mosaic theory is therefore premised on aggregation: it considers whether a set of 
nonsearches aggregated together amount to a search because their collection and subsequent analysis 
creates a revealing mosaic.”) 
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synagogue, or mosque; a strip club; or various political and civic 
organizations.189  
The Knotts and Karo beepers did not have the capacity to collect such 
details or save data that could later be analyzed by government agents.190 
The Knotts Court acknowledged that the use of beepers is limited, 
primarily because it only assisted the agents in tracking the suspect 
during a single trip.191 The Court explicitly did not address whether 
surveillance such as “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this 
country . . . without judicial knowledge or supervision” was 
constitutional.192 The Knotts Court held that, if long-term surveillance 
should eventually occur, there would be enough time to determine 
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.193 The 
Court dismissed the respondent’s concern that its decision would lead to 
the endorsement of warrantless twenty-four hour tracking of 
individuals.194 This is much different than the DEA agents who had to sit 
back and “ping” Skinner’s phone to gather information because they 
never had to physically follow him. Also, Knotts involved a shorter trip 
than Skinner’s three-day journey from Arizona to Texas. 
Furthermore, although the Jones Court never discussed Kyllo, 
“opinions like Skinner appear to be in conflict with those like Kyllo.”195 
This Note suggests that Justice Alito’s analysis would lead to the 
conclusion that Skinner is inconsistent with the Supreme Court 
precedent established in Kyllo.196 In Kyllo, the government used a 
thermal-imaging device to look inside a house to determine if marijuana 
grow lamps were giving off heat.197 There, the Court held that a search 
occurred when sense-enhancing technology revealed “any information 
regarding the home’s interior that could not otherwise have been 
obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected 
area’ . . . at least where . . . the technology in question is not in general 
public use.”198 In Skinner, mining for location data was not a method of 
observation available to members of the public, unlike a camera used for 
 
 189. April A. Otterberg, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the 
Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 661, 697–
98 (2005). 
 190. Freiwald, supra note 82, at 727–28.   
 191. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284. 
 192. Id. at 283–84. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Gelb, supra note 85, at 32. 
 196. Id. at 31. Cf. Arcila, Jr., supra note 43, at 72–73. (“The dramatic impact that this Kyllo factor 
would have had—combined with its complete failure to make any appearance whatsoever—
potentially calls into question its continued viability.”). 
 197. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001). 
 198. Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
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aerial mapping.199 As such, it is important to craft a rule that does not 
leave U.S. citizens “at the mercy of advancing technology . . . that could 
discern all human activity.”200 Unbridled access to cell location data has 
the potential to discern a significant portion of a person’s activities. 
Citizens do not have access to other people’s cell location data. The 
SCA states that entities in possession of this type of data shall not 
disclose it to anyone without meeting an enumerated exception outlined 
in the statute.201 As such, “no random member of the public could” have 
requested and received Skinner’s cell data from his “cell phone company 
for the right to track [his] location.”202 Members of the general public 
could not even subpoena the phone companies to get this type of data.203 
Only government agents can use orders under section 2703 of the SCA to 
request this information.204 The Sixth Circuit should have considered that 
the general public does not have access to cell phone location data when 
determining Skinner’s reasonable expectation to privacy.205 
B. Length-of-Trip and Type-of-Offense 
According to Justice Alito’s analysis, “relatively short-term 
monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets,” similar to those 
upheld in Knotts, is reasonable.206 However, Justice Alito wrote that “the 
use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 
impinges on expectations of privacy.”207 For these types of offenses, 
“society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others 
would not . . . secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of 
an individual’s car for a very long period.”208 He did not conclude how 
 
 199. Gelb, supra note 85, at 31. See generally Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) 
(finding a knowing exposure exception to the warrant requirement where federal agents utilized an 
aerial mapping camera to enhance that which the human eye could not observe from a lawful vantage 
point without trespassing). 
 200. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35–36. 
 201. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1) (2012); see also id.§ 2701(b)(1)–(8) (enumerating exceptions). 
 202. Sobel et al., supra note 178, at 40. 
 203. O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 89 (2006) (stating that SCA has no exception 
for civil discovery). 
 204. See generally Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 99; see also supra Part VI (discussing the 
fundamental unfairness of this statute in the criminal discovery process).  
 205. For an additional critique, see Recent Cases, supra note 150, at 802. The authors argue that the 
Sixth Circuit should have expanded the majority’s opinion in Jones and created an “electronic 
trespass.” Id. According to the authors, the court could have evaluated whether the “pinging” process 
constitutes an electronic form of trespass and had it done so, it could have decided the case on Justice 
Scalia’s trespass rationale. Id. “Because pinging is an active process that could be considered an 
electronic trespass, the court could have selected an approach that under Jones might have forestalled 
its Katz analysis entirely and allowed Congress to set the standards in this evolving area of law and 
technology.” Id. 
 206. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
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long is too long, but that the surveillance surely became unconstitutional 
before the four-week mark.209 “Justice Alito’s temporal limit frees 
‘relatively short-term monitoring’ from Fourth Amendment oversight 
but extends Fourth Amendment protections to ‘longer term GPS 
monitoring.’”210 Prior to Jones, many lower courts also struggled with 
GPS monitoring and how long the monitoring must last before it 
becomes unreasonable.211 
However, courts will likely continue to struggle with Jones because 
Justice Alito’s concurrence unfortunately provides little guidance “about 
how to resolve Fourth Amendment privacy claims apart from its crucial 
distinction between brief and prolonged GPS tracking.”212 Some have 
even said that his analysis is not helpful because “it offered only a single 
paragraph of analysis in determining that four weeks was too long.”213 
Similarly, the Skinner Court found Justice Alito’s concurrence 
inapplicable because the Jones case “involved intensive monitoring over 
a 28-day period . . . [as opposed to] the DEA agents [who] only tracked 
Skinner’s cell phone for three days.”214 
Despite the flaw of establishing no clear line between brief and 
prolonged tracking, Justice Alito could consider other factors of the 
surveillance in Skinner to determine that the tracking was too long. He 
could take into account factors such as the distance of the surveillance, 
whether it was around the clock, and whether it crossed different 
jurisdictions.215 Justice Scalia’s property-based rationale is silent in regard 
to these additional factors as they are irrelevant to physical trespass. In 
contrast, Justice Alito’s analysis leaves open the possibility to include 
these factors when examining a person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their cell phone location data. 
Besides the length of the offense, Justice Alito considers the type of 
underlying offense. Jones and Skinner’s offenses are similar because they 
both involve drug conspiracies. As such, Skinner’s offense would not fit 
into Justice Alito’s exception involving investigating extraordinary 
 
 209. Id. 
 210. Arcila, Jr., supra note 43, at 44. 
 211. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that twenty-eight 
days was too much), aff’d in part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). But see United 
States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 274 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that sixty hours was not enough), 
vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012); United States v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216, 221 (5th Cir. 2011) (raising a 
theoretical concern about GPS monitoring, but distinguishing itself from Maynard based on the length 
of the trip and the surveillance not being around the clock). 
 212. Arcila, Jr., supra note 43, at 45. 
 213. Leading Cases, Fourth Amendment—Search and GPS Surveillance: United States v. Jones, 
126 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 233 (2013). 
 214. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (2013). 
However, length of trip is not the only factor and Justice Alito’s analysis would not change solely on 
the trip lasting three days.  
 215. See infra Part VI.A. 
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offenses. In extraordinary cases, Justice Alito stated “long-term tracking 
might have been mounted using previously available techniques.”216 
Furthermore, in Justice Sotomayor’s “statement of agreement with Justice 
Alito that long term monitoring impinges expectations of privacy, Justice 
Sotomayor qualified her statement as applicable to ‘most offenses.’”217 
However, Justice Alito’s concurrence would still be applicable because 
Skinner does not deal with an extraordinary offense. 
V.  Justice Sotomayor–the Fifth Vote 
For “Alito’s Way” to become a majority opinion, he needs one 
more vote, as four Justices have already signed on to his concurrence. 
Justice Sotomayor is the most likely fifth vote because her concurring 
opinion has a much broader interpretation of an individual’s reasonable 
expectation to privacy. There is a much stronger chance to overturn the 
Sixth Circuit with Justice Alito’s framework because there is no guarantee 
a majority of the current Justices would adopt Justice Sotomayor’s ideas, 
especially revisiting the third-party doctrine.218 Justice Sotomayor agreed 
that the physical intrusion is a Fourth Amendment violation at a 
minimum but also discussed the reasonable expectation of privacy, shifts 
in technology, and a willingness to revisit the third-party doctrine, as that 
approach is ill-suited to the digital age.219 She also alluded to the 
adaptation of the mosaic theory of a reasonable expectation of privacy 
when discussing GPS surveillance because it “generates a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a 
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”220 However, she expressly agreed that, “at the very 
 
 216. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 217. Murphy, supra note 18, at 337 (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
 218. For general critical discussions of the third-party doctrine, see Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 Md. 
L. Rev. 614, 680 (2011); Christopher Slobogin, Privacy at Risk: The New Government 
Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment 17 (2007); Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third 
Hand: Lessons from the Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1199, 1202 
(2009) (suggesting that an alternative set of rules that “produces the best mix of privacy and security” 
is preferable to the reasonable expectations test); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth 
Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 Pepp. L. 
Rev. 975, 977 (2007) (suggesting a factor-based approach to the third party doctrine). But see Orin S. 
Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 561, 563–66 (2009) (arguing that critics 
of the third-party doctrine overlook its substantial benefits). 
 219. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 220. Id. at 955. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). This is commonly referred to as the “mosaic theory.” 
See supra note 188; see also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing 
mosaic theory of Jones’s movements), aff’d in part sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945; United States v. 
Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (“By tracking and 
recording the movements of millions of individuals the government can use computers to detect 
patterns and develop suspicions.”), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012). But see generally Orin S. Kerr, The 
Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 311 (2012). 
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least, ‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 
impinges on expectations of privacy’” and would agree with Justice 
Alito’s interpretation.221 
VI.  Refining Alito’s Way 
Justice Alito’s concurrence has prompted two common critiques: that 
it (1) does not define what period of surveillance is too long, and (2) does 
not define which types of offenses are extraordinary.222 This Part briefly 
refines these two elements223 and provides suggestions to future courts that 
employ Justice Alito’s opinion to determine when the collection of 
warrantless cell phone location data becomes unconstitutional. 
A. Refining the Length-of-Trip Prong 
Justice Alito focused on the number of days to determine when 
surveillance lasts too long. This Note proposes that courts should adopt a 
multi-factor test and look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the surveillance in dispute. Based on the language of Justice Alito’s 
opinion, the number of days would be the most important factor. A court 
should also strongly consider Justice Alito’s language that the 
surveillance should be similar to the type upheld in Knotts and ask: Did 
the government agents ever have any visual contact? This is an important 
factor because it concerns allocation of government resources and 
“provides guidance as to his thinking because he had earlier emphasized 
that, prior to technological advances, practical resource constraints had 
limited the amount and intrusiveness of governmental searches, with the 
government choosing to make special efforts only in rare and significant 
cases.”224 Courts could also consider factors such as the distance of the 
surveillance, whether it was around the clock, and whether it crossed 
jurisdictions. 
In Skinner’s case, Justice Alito could consider the fact that the DEA 
never conducted any visual surveillance.225 Also, he could take into 
account the overall distance. In this case, the DEA monitored Skinner as 
he drove from Tucson, Arizona, to Abilene, Texas.226 This warrantless 
tracking lasted for more than 760 miles.227 A final fact to consider is that 
the tracking crossed state lines. When considering these various factors, 
 
 221. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 222. See supra notes 18, 196. 
 223. See supra Parts V.B–C. 
 224. Arcila, Jr., supra note 43, at 66. 
 225. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 776 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (2013). 
 226. Id. 
 227. See Driving Distance from Tucson, AZ,. to Abilene, TX, TravelMath, http://www.travelmath 
.com (Use “Travel Calculator” on homepage; then search “Get” for “driving distance”, search “From” 
for “Tucson, AZ” and search “To” for “Abilene, TX”; then follow “Calculate” hyperlink). 
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the tracking in Skinner would likely satisfy the “length-of-trip” prong of 
Justice Alito’s concurrence. 
B. Refining the Type-of-Offense Prong 
As discussed in Subpart VI.C, Jones and Skinner had committed 
similar offenses involving drug trafficking conspiracies. This Note 
proposes that Justice Alito’s “extraordinary offenses” would rarely 
include the surveillance of criminal enterprises in the smuggling and 
trafficking of contraband such as drugs, weapons, or counterfeit goods. 
Jones228 and Skinner229 illustrate this proposal. In Jones, although the 
agents applied for a warrant, they did not follow the magistrate Judge’s 
guidelines. Both of these cases involved ongoing investigations with 
multiple parties that most likely took a substantial amount of time to 
thoroughly investigate. In this regard, there was ample opportunity for 
the government agents to make a probable cause showing and for 
determinations to access Skinner’s cell phone location data “be drawn by 
a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the ‘often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”230 
Justice Alito would likely require a warrant in these circumstances. 
In contrast, this Note hypothesizes that courts would find that the 
definition of an extraordinary offense includes exigent circumstances. One 
example would be the kidnapping of a child. If there was an “Amber 
Alert” issued after a child had been kidnapped and the police had a 
suspect, the police should be able to immediately request the suspect’s cell 
phone location data to help track the suspect. One scholar has also argued 
that terrorism would fit into Justice Alito’s extraordinary offense analysis 
as well.231 As the Skinner case does not include these types of facts, his 
alleged crimes would not be extraordinary offenses and Skinner would 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone location data. 
Conclusion 
The Sixth Circuit’s rationale in Skinner illustrates the inherent 
limitations of Justice Scalia’s property-based holding in Jones. As this 
Note has discussed, technologies like pinging and cell phone location 
data make it unnecessary for government officials to place a GPS on a 
suspect’s car if they want to track the suspect. By focusing on Justice 
Alito’s concurrence and his three prongs of analysis (Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the length of tracking, and the type of offense), courts can 
protect individuals like Skinner and Jones from unchecked government 
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intrusion.232 Although the majority opinion may ultimately be of limited 
value in protecting the privacy interests of Americans as technology such 
as cell phone location data makes physical intrusions obsolete, courts can 
correct this by using “Alito’s Way” to hold that individuals have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell location data. 
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_up_for_life (reporting that Jones said after his victory at the Supreme Court, “I am very happy with the 
Supreme Court decision and I hope the decision helps millions of Americans preserve their right to have 
reasonable expectation of privacy”). 
